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ABSTRACT  
 
 
In the Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta region of the Northwest Territories, devolution has 
reconfigured institutional arrangements responsible for managing oil and gas development. Today, a 
diversity of perspectives exist regarding constraints to oil and gas development within the 
regulatory regime that has emerged from the process of devolution. This thesis identifies the 
strengths and limitations of the regulatory regime that has emerged from the process of 
devolution, as well as where perceived problems and challenges may have been exaggerated. In 
such cases, first impressions as opposed to actual experience with the regulatory system, as well 
as confusion stemming from the existence of two separate regulatory regimes in the NWT 
contribute to negative perceptions of the regime.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem and Context of Study 
The signing of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement in 1984 represented an historic step in the 
devolution of powers from the federal government to local authorities in Canada’s North.  The 
Agreement fundamentally reconfigured institutional arrangements in the Beaufort Sea and 
Mackenzie Delta region of the Northwest Territories, and enhanced the decision-making capacity 
of the Inuvialuit people to influence and benefit from the development of oil and gas resources in 
the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR) (Fig. 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Geographic location of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region. (Office of the Auditor 
General, 2007). 
 
At the core of these devolved institutional arrangements is an integrated, decentralized approach 
to regulation, reflecting recognition on the part of legislators that Inuvialuit people have the right 
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to meaningfully participate in discussions of what should or should not happen to the land upon 
which they have depended and thrived for generations.  In the nearly three decades that have 
passed since the signing of the Agreement and the legal establishment of the ISR, however, a 
warming climate and uncertain global energy supplies have served to heighten demand for 
energy-development in the Canadian North.  These drivers have led to an increasing need for a 
regulatory approach to managing oil and gas resource development that can effectively balance 
the varying interests of stakeholders - communities, environmental groups, industry, and 
regulators – in meeting global energy demands and managing the impacts of energy development 
on climate change and regional and local socioeconomic and biophysical environments. 
Today, a diversity of perspectives exist regarding the limitations and constraints to oil 
and gas development and regulation in the ISR.  Some voices in industry, for example, argue that 
the regulatory regime of the ISR is overly complicated and deters exploration and development 
activity (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2008, Dixit et al. 2008, Harrison 2006), 
thus preventing opportunities for Inuvialuit communities to benefit from energy resource 
development.  Further, some government and industry actors identify an apparent confusion over 
the roles and responsibilities of those involved in development and applying regulations 
(Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, 2008, McCrank 2008, INAC, 2005).  
Underscoring such concerns over the management of oil and gas development in the region, the 
federal government has recently committed nearly $22 million for research in the Beaufort Sea to 
assist regulators in their decision-making capacity in relation to oil and gas exploration and 
development (INAC, 2010).  
Conversely, environmental groups and researchers have argued that concerns regarding 
the complexity and capacity of the regulatory regime are exaggerated; they emphasize strengths 
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to the regulatory regime (Alternatives North, 2008) and argue that it is no more complicated than 
that of other northern jurisdictions (INAC, 2005).  Further, one could argue that devolution, 
through the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, may have in fact strengthened the ability of developers 
to operate in the Beaufort region, as Inuvialuit communities have generally been supportive of 
resource development, often in contrast to the neighbouring regulatory environment of the 
Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA). 
The problem is that there has been limited critical analysis of the regulatory regime as it 
applies to the Beaufort region.  Much of the analyses of the regulatory systems in the Northwest 
Territories have up to this point taken the form of government reports (INAC 2005, INAC 
2009a, McCrank, 2008), academic papers describing geographic research (Armitage, 2004, 
Christensen et al., 2007), or criticisms of the findings of others (Alternatives North, 2008, 
Charlie and Simpson, 2008).  Although such analyses provide valuable insight into the diversity 
of perspectives regarding the overall functionality of the regulatory systems of the territory, they 
arrive at what are often conflicting conclusions.  
Specific to the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, much of the research to date has tended 
largely to focus on governance and environmental issues related to the regulatory regime 
(Cameron and White, 1995, Fitzpatrick et al., 2008, Hamilton, 1994, Kulchyski, 2005, Wilson, 
2005,) and much less on the structure and efficacy of the regime itself.  Such research is 
valuable, however, in providing background and context to the regulatory system that has 
emerged and does serve to inform this thesis.  In addition, the research on regulatory policy in 
the NWT has tended to focus on the area regulated under the MVRMA with far less emphasis on 
the ISR.  In some cases this is stated in the contents of the documents, such as the McCrank 
Report, in which it is specified: “This review also includes an examination of the common 
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themes across the ISR, but the focus is on the regulatory system covered by the MVRMA” 
(2008, p.2).  In other cases, however, emphasis is on broad regulatory issues in the territory with 
little if any distinction between the separate regimes (INAC, 2005, CAPP, 2008).  This creates 
the possibility that perceived problems with regulatory policy in the Mackenzie Valley are 
simply being extrapolated to the ISR. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the consequences of devolution on resource 
management and environmental assessment in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region of the NWT. 
Drawing on information collected from document review and semi-structured interviews, this 
thesis identifies and assesses the strengths and limitations of the regulatory regime that have 
emerged from the process of devolution, as well as where perceived problems and challenges 
may be exaggerated and why. Specifically, this thesis examines the following questions: 
1. How has devolution shaped the policy environment of the ISR?  
2. What are the current regulatory and procedural challenges to EA and approvals for oil and 
gas development in the ISR? Why do they exist? Are they being exaggerated? 
3. Are regulatory and procedural challenges to EA and approvals for oil and gas development 
in the ISR exacerbated or diminished as a result of devolution in the NWT? 
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1.2 Research methods 
 
This thesis conducts a policy analysis of the regulatory regime established in the ISR with the 
settlement of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement. Policy analysis “represents the efforts of actors 
inside and outside formal political decision-making processes to improve policy outcomes by 
applying systematic evaluative rationality” (Howlett & Lindquist, 2007, p.87).  Put simply, 
policy analysis is “the disciplined application of intellect to public problems” (Pal, 2010, p.13). 
Following the approach presented by Dunn (2008), the research will use multiple methods of 
inquiry to inform the analysis and to provide insight into potential policy problems in the ISR. 
In conducting policy analysis, it is important to recognize that there are likely to be 
varying perspectives among stakeholders, particularly in policy arenas where devolution has 
distributed roles and responsibilities of governance to multiple actors.  In their review of policy 
analysis in Canada, Howlett and Lindquist acknowledge the complexity of the Canadian case: “It 
is difficult to overstate the complexity of Canadian federalism and its supporting policy 
institutions in such a huge, regionally and linguistically diverse country with provinces and 
territories of starkly different fiscal, population, and land bases (2007, p.98).  In considering  
varying perspectives as they appear in existing analyses of the regulatory system of the ISR, the 
thesis draws from the principles of the “case survey method” of Heald and Yin (1975), which 
“works best when the studies consist of a heterogeneous collection of case studies.  The 
reviewer’s main task then is to aggregate the characteristics, but not necessarily the conclusions, 
of these cases” (p.371).  
The thesis will seek further guidance from Ripley’s features of “good science” in policy 
analysis (1985), which calls for the identification of patterns and the relationships between 
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patterns.  Since devolution is an ongoing process, and the ISR regime a consequence of that 
ongoing process, we cannot point to a specific moment which could then be viewed as the 
independent variable with the regime as the dependent variable.  The research approach then 
necessitates a case study strategy as an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident,” and multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 2003, p.23).  With 
further guidance from Pal’s model of the “logical analysis,” the thesis applies a qualitative 
approach to policy analysis, as a qualitative case study.  Pal’s approach allows the researcher to 
evaluate a policy in terms of its internal, vertical and horizontal consistency “and whether it 
makes sense” (2010, p.17).  The thesis will also go beyond a logical policy analysis by 
considering not only the intended effects of policy decisions in the ISR, but the actual effects of 
policy through empirical policy analysis (Pal, 2010). 
Through triangulation, the thesis will examine the ISR’s regulatory regime as it relates to 
oil and development through a number of approaches.  Triangulation is “the use of multiple 
methods, databases, theories, disciplines and/or investigators to study the same object, event or 
phenomenon” (Roe, 1998, p.85) and is used to inform the research, drawing on document review 
and semi-structured interviews.  In addition to existing monographs, the use of government 
documents at both the territorial and federal level provided much of the basis for background 
information on devolution and territorial history.  Further information on the regulatory regime is 
gathered with the review of relevant academic papers.  To investigate the varying perspectives 
on resource management in the Beaufort, particular attention is given to reports prepared by 
industry, environmental groups and Northerners.  
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Table 1. Sample of key documents and reports reviewed during the data collection process  
  
Author Title Year 
INAC 2005 NWT Environmental 
Audit 
 
2005 
INAC, Neil McCrank  Road to improvement: the 
review of the regulatory 
systems across the North 
2008 
 
Arctic Journal. Harrison, C 
Industry perspectives on 
barriers, hurdles, and irritants 
preventing development of 
frontier energy in Canada’s 
Arctic Islands  
2006 
Alternatives North 
 
A response to the “road to 
improvement” report by Neil 
McCrank on regulatory 
systems across the North 
2008 
Arctic Journal. Dixit, B., 
Millman, P., Reid, J., Sparkes, 
A., Voutier, K. 
Sustainable energy 
development in Canada’s 
Mackenzie Delta – Beaufort 
Sea coastal region 
2008 
Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers 
Northern regulatory 
improvement initiative: a 
submission to Neil McCrank 
2008 
Charlie, R., Bob Simpson A joint response from the 
Gwich’in Settlement Area to: 
road to improvement “the 
review of the regulatory 
systems across the North.” 
2008 
 
 Further insight into regulatory strengths and challenges in the Beaufort is gained by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with individuals bearing knowledge and/or experience 
with regulatory issues in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region.  Two individuals with the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA), one individual with the National Energy Board, 
and one representative of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation are interviewed by phone in 
February of 2011.  Interviews conducted by Ketilson (2011) provide further insight, as her 
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research explores similar themes as part of a broader research initiative of which this thesis is 
part of.  In both cases, participants are asked what they perceive to be the central strengths of and 
challenges to the regulatory regime of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, particularly as such 
strengths and challenges relate to offshore oil and gas development.  The responses offered a 
wide range of perspectives which served to inform the thesis. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis is presented in five chapters, including the Introduction.  Chapter two focuses on the 
process of devolution and recent history of the region towards an integrated, decentralized 
approach to regulation in the NWT, specifically in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region.  Attention 
then turns to an overview of the regulatory system that has emerged, examining the structural 
basis of the existing regime by exploring the various Acts and legislation that define it, as well as 
the boards, organizations and corporations that have emerged as result.  Next, supposed problems 
associated with the regulatory regime are discussed, as reported in both the 2005 NWT 
Environmental Audit and the McCrank Report, and further revealed in the responses of 
stakeholders to these documents.  An understanding of the legislative underpinnings of the 
regulatory regime provides insight to possible explanations for the challenges associated with oil 
and gas development and environmental assessment in the region, such as areas where 
responsibilities are not clearly defined or are overlapping.  Based on this information, a 
description of the regulatory process in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region is presented to explain 
how it actually operates and how oil and gas development projects currently manoeuvre through 
the system.  A communication matrix is then presented to illustrate the jurisdictional 
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responsibilities of the stakeholders, to identify those areas in which perspectives and 
responsibilities are unclear or overlap, consequentially producing conflict and disagreement 
among diverging interests.  Central problems and issues associated with the current regulatory 
regime as it relates specifically to oil and gas development are identified, providing insight into 
areas requiring further research, as well as possible recommendations for clarifying or adjusting 
the existing regulatory regime.  Finally, the role that devolution has played in affecting resource 
development in the Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta is discussed. 
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Chapter Two 
Background and Literature Review 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, governance in Canada’s Northern territories has transformed dramatically. 
Contrasting Ottawa’s distant colonial administration of the past, today’s territories exercise 
provincial-like responsibilities, and have been significantly impacted by the negotiation and 
settlement of land-claims.  This decentralizing process of transferring powers and responsibilities 
from a central government to smaller, regional levels of government is known as devolution. 
Understanding the history of this process in the Northwest Territories (NWT) is essential to 
understanding the regulatory regime that was established with the signing of the Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement (IFA).  As such, this chapter describes the historical process of devolution in the 
Territory and the parallel Aboriginal land claims negotiations and agreements, with particular 
attention on the IFA and the key organizational bodies established through the Agreement.   
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2.2 Devolution 
In the Canadian North, few significant political events have occurred in recent decades that were 
not directly connected to the process of devolution (White, 2011).  Devolution describes the 
transfer of authority from a senior level of government to a junior level, and can be viewed as 
both a theoretical concept and as an administrative process (Dacks, 1990):  “viewed 
theoretically, devolution can be seen as an instance of decolonization which can be usefully 
related to literature on political development.... Viewed as an administrative process, the study of 
devolution can contribute to understandings of institutional change in general, and… to 
particular issues of development administration…” (p.5-6). There are two dimensions to the 
concept: 
Decentralization (devolution) has a spatial aspect in that authority and responsibility are 
moved to organizations and jurisdictions in different physical locations, from the center 
to the local level. And it has an institutional aspect in that these transfers involve 
reallocating roles and functions both within government, from one central government 
agency to lower-level jurisdictions and agencies; and between government and civil 
society, through service coproduction and partnerships as well as joint policymaking and 
feedback mechanisms (Brinkerhoff, D., Brinkerhoff, J. & McNulty, 2007, p.190-191). 
 
Clancy relates this insight to the northern context, arguing: “The fact that devolution combines a 
spatial with an institutional dimension emphasizes that it is pre-eminently a program for northern 
resident interests, straining against absentee or remote political control” (1990, p. 14-15).  
 Viewing the regulatory regime of the ISR through the lens of devolution provides context 
for understanding the system that has emerged with the process, and is vital to understanding the 
relationships between multiple levels of governance and numerous organizations and co-
management bodies in such a decentralized political arena:  “The unique nature of many self-
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government arrangements and the diversity of organizations that play a role in intergovernmental 
relations between Aboriginal peoples and federal, provincial and municipal governments 
requires a flexible framework of analysis that takes into consideration both traditional and non-
traditional actors and institutions” (Wilson, 2008, p.74). 
Arguments favouring the devolution of powers and resources to local levels of 
governance emphasize that the enhanced decision-making power, authority and control over 
resources play a pivotal role economic and social development (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).  
They contend that devolution will result in increased citizen participation in local political 
processes where “local governments are perceived to have the capacity to make political and 
financial decisions affecting their economic and social welfare” (p.12).  The improved allocation 
of resources is the most common theoretical argument for decentralization (Azfar, Kahkonen, 
Lanyi, Meagher & Rutherford, 2004).  By bringing government closer to local people, it is 
asserted that the government will be better informed to local needs and preferences, resulting in 
increased accountability and enhanced responsiveness of officials and government at the 
empowered local or regional level (Oates, 1972, Brinkerhoff et al., 2007).  
 Where Aboriginal peoples are involved, research links Aboriginal economic 
development with successful self-government (Calliou, 2008), and as such, self-government 
tends to be the objective that many First Nation leaders advocate for through negotiations with 
government.  The settling of land claims is a significant step towards self-government, as 
comprehensive land claim agreements provide a legal and institutional basis from which 
Aboriginal peoples can gradually acquire further powers and responsibilities (Papillon, 2008). 
Interestingly, in Canada’s Territories, the advocacy of devolution to the level of self-government 
for First Nations and Inuit communities actually impedes devolution at the territorial level.  On 
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the issue of territorial control over resources, First Nations and Aboriginal communities in the 
territories “frequently see the territorial governments as illegitimate, usurping powers and 
resources that rightfully belong to them” (White, 2011, p.757), and often oppose the territorial 
pursuit of provincial-status unless their regional claims are resolved or resource revenue sharing 
agreements are signed (McArthur, 2009). 
There is, however, no consensus on the perceived benefits of legally recognized self-
government (Belanger, 2008, Alcantara, 2008).  There are also conflicting perspectives in the 
academic realm regarding the desirability and potential consequences of devolution and political 
decentralization.  Arguments against decentralization fall into two categories, focusing either on 
national effects or local effects (Azfar et al., 2004).  At the national level, scholars have argued 
that the establishment of sub-national (or sub-provincial/territorial) governments can lead to 
fiscal deficits, as local government debts are reluctantly absorbed by the central government 
(Azfar et al., 2004, Treisman, 2007).  At the local level, rather than increasing democratic 
accountability, it has been argued that local elites can benefit disproportionately from devolution, 
effectively creating “authoritarian enclaves” in local settings (Diamond, 1999., Hutchcroft, 
2001). 
Shackleton et al., (2002) suggest that arguments favouring devolution (specifically in 
relation to natural resource management) typically amount to little more than rhetoric.  We are 
cautioned that general presumptions in favour of decentralization are “hard to justify” (Treisman, 
2007, p.246), as it is difficult to identify specific political conditions that will result in positive or 
negative effects (Treisman).  It has been further argued that political decentralization can result 
in unfulfilled expectations and unanticipated problems (Grindle, 2007), and in some cases, 
“devolution of legal powers and administrative responsibilities to subnational units of 
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government has left some localities ill-prepared and unequipped to meet the demands placed 
upon them in the complex intergovernmental system” (McGuire et al, 1994, p.426).  
In the Canadian context, the past three decades have seen the power and authorities of the 
territorial governments and Inuvialuit, First Nations, and Metis communities in the territories 
grow considerably.  This is not only a reflection of the desire of Northerners and their 
governments for greater decision-making capacity regarding political and economic issues 
affecting their communities, but also reflects recognition by the federal government that those 
best able to govern Northern communities are Northerners themselves (White, 2002).  Through 
the transfer of provincial-like authorities from the federal government to the territories, 
devolution and Aboriginal land claims agreements have fundamentally reshaped governance and 
development in the Canadian North (Kulchyski, 2005, Funston, 2007). 
In the NWT, devolution was advocated on the grounds that the sheer size of the territory 
required regional governance structures for rational administration, and that enhanced power and 
responsibilities at the local level would allow for greater levels of political participation amongst 
racial minorities (Weller, 1990).  As a result, governance in the NWT today allows for increased 
flexibility, as well as stronger regional and local control; it also reflects the complex and diverse 
interplay of intergovernmental relations in the North.  But it is possible that devolution may have 
led to some of the unanticipated consequences described above, specifically in those areas 
identified by stakeholders as regulatory challenges or perceived weaknesses with the regulatory 
regime.  To provide background to today’s regulatory environment in the NWT, this chapter 
turns to a review of federalism and the political history of the Territory, with the Aboriginal land 
claims negotiations and agreements that have emerged through the process of devolution.  
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Particular attention is given to the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) and the key organizational 
bodies established with its signing.   
 
2.3 Federalism in the NWT 
Contemporary governance in the NWT is complex: the territory does not enjoy constitutional 
recognition as an order of government, and Aboriginal land claims play an enormous role in 
intergovernmental relations.  Lacking the constitutional recognition that its provincial 
counterparts enjoy, the NWT operates under the legislative jurisdiction of the federal 
government, and as such, one might expect that this would be preferential to the complicated, 
often adversarial relationship between the federal government and the provinces.  White (2002, 
p.89), for example, notes that “Among the most pressing problems facing the Canadian 
federation, those involving the accommodation of Aboriginal people’s rights, aspirations, and 
interests arguably raise the most fundamental and most difficult governance issues.”  The added 
remoteness of many Northern communities, and the diversity of interests between industry 
stakeholders, government administrators, non-governmental organizations, and between northern 
residents themselves, illustrate that there is no “one size fits all” administrative approach to be 
taken.  As such, the relationships between the territories and the federal government have 
evolved to accommodate such challenges and interests. 
 In the NWT, for example, accommodation and the shift to democratic representation is a 
relatively recent development.  For much of the territory’s history, it was unrepresentative of 
Northern people, who were primarily of Dené, Métis, or Inuit descent, and it was governed by 
administrators rather than politicians (Kulchyski, 2005).  When the federal government did begin 
considering the social and economic circumstances of the Aboriginal population living 
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throughout the territory, it did so largely out of self-interest relating to mining activities, and 
later, oil and gas development (Alunik et al, 2003).   
 Such were the motivating factors of the numbered treaties relevant to the region.  For 
example, “Treaty Eight (1899) was negotiated because of the gold rush in the Yukon; … Treaty 
Eleven (1921) was negotiated because of fears of an oil rush after non-Natives learned from 
Dené about oil at Norman Wells on the Deh Cho in 1920” (Kulchyski, 2005, p. 81).  As Abele 
(2005) argues, “political development (in the North) has always followed externally generated 
pressures for resource development” (p.226). 
This was the case with Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, where in both cases the treaties sought to 
govern relations between the Canadian government and Aboriginal people, as well as to assure 
that the Crown had control over Indigenous lands (Abele, 2005).  There was little desire on the 
part of the federal government to sign treaties in other parts of the territory.  “The policy was not 
to talk about a treaty until it was needed for mineral development or the opening up of land for 
settlement” (Hamilton, 1994, p.69), and as such, beyond treaties 8 and 11, no other treaties were 
signed involving any regions of the NWT.  This allowed colonial administration of the territory 
to continue unabated into the middle of the twentieth century, with general indifference on the 
part of government to the social and political circumstances of Aboriginal people.  “Non-
interference in the lives of Northern Aboriginal peoples was the standard policy through the first 
half of the 20
th
 century, reflecting more on the difficulties, cost, and lack of interest associated 
with integrating northern communities into the growing Canadian society rather than a 
benevolent intention on the part of the federal government to maintain Northern cultures” 
(Alunik et al., 2003, p.162). 
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Gradually, however, commitments to health, education and social welfare grew in the 
North as with the broader country during the post-war period (Clancy, 1990).  In addition, the 
increased presence of non-Aboriginal Canadians in the North, largely relating to military 
operations, reduced the relative isolation of many Aboriginal communities, and generally 
increased awareness amongst southerners of the poor health conditions in Northern communities 
(Abele, 2005).  Accordingly, the principles of non-interference and general indifference began to 
change in the 1950s, characterized by increased emphasis on social welfare.  The result of this, 
for better or for worse, was an increased federal role in the North, and a transition in the 
approach of the federal government from one of indifference to one of paternalism.  
This role was to be largely based on the assumption that Aboriginal culture was 
disappearing, and that the adoption of Canadian mainstream culture and the market economy was 
necessary and inevitable.  Justice Thomas R. Berger describes the programs initiated during this 
period: 
The short-run-solution to the Northern crisis was the provision of health and welfare 
measures.  The long-run solution was the education of Native people to enable them to 
enter the wage economy.  The Native people who were still living in the bush and on the 
barrens had to live in the settlements if they were to receive the benefits of the new 
dispensation, and if their children were to attend school (Berger, 1998, p.131). 
 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s “Road to Resources” strategy for development in the North 
focused even more attention on the need to respond to the social problems plaguing many Inuit 
and First Nation communities.  Administering new programs and overseeing developments 
required considerable expansion of government services in the North, and the viability of 
administration out of Ottawa became less realistic (Cameron & White, 1995, p.48-49). 
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The development of government social services in the North demanded that Inuit groups 
that had previously lived in different areas at different times (relating to the migratory patterns of 
wildlife and traditional activities) (Nuttall, 1998) be moved into permanent settlements, and into 
planned communities.  As new programs and policies fundamentally altered the lives and 
cultures of Aboriginal people, so too did the systems of governance in the territory begin to 
drastically change.  The 1966 Carrothers Commission (formally The Advisory Commission on 
the Development of Government in the NWT) proposed “a series of measures to enhance the 
autonomy of the Government of the NWT and to increase the degree of political autonomy for 
the people of the NWT.”  Its recommendations that Yellowknife become the territorial capital 
and that the entire apparatus of the territorial administration be transferred to the North were 
implemented in 1967 (Cameron & White 1995, p.49).  This event is humorously described by 
Hamilton:  
“On 18 September 1967 two DC-7 aircraft landed at Yellowknife.  The first one carried 
seventy-four civil servants and their families; the second thirty tons of files.  The capture 
of Yellowknife by the Ottawa bureaucracy was thus accomplished without a shot being 
fired” (1994, p.103). 
 
This “capture of Yellowknife” represented a major step in the devolution of power from 
Ottawa to the North, but was not without controversy.  Several Aboriginal organizations 
contested, and continue to contest the legitimacy of the GNWT, arguing that “the devolution of 
powers from Ottawa to the GNWT is an improper abrogation of Canada’s fiduciary 
responsibilities under the treaties… (and thus), program authority, and the funding to support it, 
(should be transferred) directly to Aboriginal people” (Cameron & White, 1995, p.44).  Further, 
control over sub-surface rights and natural resources – essentially the only revenue producing 
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sources available – remained within the jurisdiction of the federal government (Hamilton, 1994, 
p.101), denying the GNWT the opportunity to substantially generate its own funds. 
Ironically, the shift in the administration of the territory from Ottawa to Yellowknife 
represented a loss in power for some communities.  Frank T’Seleie, Dené activist and 
community leader described; “We lost a lot of control when the territorial government moved in 
1967 and began establishing their own administrations in the communities, and completely 
bypassing the authority of the bands” (Kulchyski, 2005, p.156).  Having been more or less 
ignored for decades, many communities resented the increased presence in their lives of what 
surely must have seemed to be, at least initially, an alien government. 
Still, this shift in the location of power carried great symbolism.  Governance in the 
North was to be no longer directed from the south, but was intended to become representative of 
the Northern population.  The changing approach of federalism during this period reflected the 
need for a more regional system that could efficiently and more locally administer to people 
living in remote regions throughout the territory.  
 
2.4 The Inuvialuit Final Agreement 
By the early 1970s, the devolution of powers from the federal to the new Yellowknife-based 
government of the Northwest Territories was underway; but there remained significant problems 
with this new design of governance, particularly in terms of representation.  It wasn’t until 1965 
that the first Aboriginal person was appointed to the territorial Council, with Aboriginal people 
remaining a minority on the Council and essentially absent from the upper levels of the territorial 
government (Cameron and White, 1995).  It was in this context that Aboriginal communities in 
the NWT found themselves to be living on land that industry was increasingly seeking to exploit 
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for its rich hydrocarbon resources.  However, as mentioned above, such resources remained the 
property of the federal government, as it alone had jurisdiction over sub-surface resources, and 
there were virtually no means for Aboriginal people in the territory to engage or affect the 
government at the time.  
Such was the situation of the Inuvialuit people, living in the Mackenzie Delta and 
Western Arctic Islands region who found their traditional land to be of immense strategic 
importance with the discovery of vast oil and natural gas reserves in the 1970s (INAC, 2008).  
Seismic exploration in the Mackenzie Delta, following a major oil strike in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, 
had led to a major oil find in Inuvialuit territory in 1970.  This, in turn, led to greatly increased 
industry interest and exploration in the region, but with little concern for the interests of the 
Inuvialuit.  
Increased oil and gas activity focused the eyes of Canadians on the North.  A central 
issue was the federally supported proposal for the Mackenzie Valley Gas Pipeline, which was to 
move natural gas from Alaska to southern markets.  Planning for the project had proceeded 
largely behind closed doors, with essentially zero input from residents of the NWT (Hamilton, 
1994).  In spite of this, concern was expressed regarding the potential implications of such a 
massive project for the environment, the economy, and of course, the Aboriginal people who 
would be most affected.  Proponents of the project, including the president of the Arctic Gas 
Pipeline Project, stressed the urgency of the situation to Canadians: “Supplies of energy from the 
western provinces are now inadequate to meet all of Canada’s requirements.”  He argued that 
importing energy with rising prices would cost Canadians billions of dollars, and the 
construction of the pipeline was the most logical energy option (CBC Archives, 2009).   
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From this context, the federal government appointed Justice Thomas Berger to head a 
commission with a mandate of investigating the social, economic and environmental impacts of 
the proposed project.  The commission would identify the concerns of Canadians, paying 
particular attention to the concerns of Aboriginal people in the NWT.  The commission offered 
recommendations that were largely favourable to Aboriginal views, and advocated at least a ten-
year moratorium on construction to enable Aboriginal land claims to be settled before 
construction work began (Chiperzak et al., 2005).  The commission also raised awareness of the 
industrial activity in the Mackenzie Delta region, and a need for Inuvialuit control over the land. 
The participation and input of Aboriginal communities in the pipeline inquiry was part of 
a broader trend, and “one aspect of a general movement among the Indigenous peoples of the 
Northwest Territories towards negotiating increased control over impending economic 
development.  Another was their engagement with comprehensive claims negotiation” (Abele et 
al., 2009, p.228).  A motivating factor for the Inuvialuit to finalize a comprehensive land claim 
was the oil and gas boom in the Beaufort Sea (Cameron and White, 1995), that largely resulted 
from the fuel price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s and from lucrative federal financial and tax 
incentives.  There was increased industry interest and exploration in the Mackenzie Delta and 
Beaufort Sea region during this period (Dixit et al., 2008), and this activity served to heighten 
Inuvialuit awareness of the need for local control (Cameron and White, 1995).  Such motivation 
was broadly consistent with Aboriginal self-determination movements in Northern Canada: 
“protecting indigenous homelands with environmental management programmes that integrate 
conventional scientific approaches with traditional or indigenous knowledge, yet arguing for the 
need to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable economic base in Northern 
communities” (Nuttall, 1998, p.24). 
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 The federal government also had a vested interest in settling land claims, emerging from 
potential difficulties it saw as likely to arise with potential oil and gas development in the 
Northern context.  The negotiation of land claims was viewed as a legal process that urgently 
needed to be undertaken for such development to proceed (Frideras and Gadacz, 2001).  Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada cites the negotiations of land claims as a priority that actually 
slowed exploration and development activities in the north during the 1980’s, as developers 
awaited the clarification of issues of land ownership (INAC, 2008).  
In responding to Inuvialuit demands for control over the development of their land, as 
well as to the eagerness of industry to exploit the oil and natural gas resources in the Beaufort 
Sea/Mackenzie Delta region, the government sought a negotiated solution that could 
accommodate diverse ambitions and needs.  The result, following a decade of negotiations with 
the Inuvialuit Committee for Original People’s Entitlement (COPE), was the Western Arctic 
(Inuvialuit) Final Agreement, signed in 1984.  
The IFA ensured that the Inuvialuit would maintain control over their traditional land 
through claims-mandated joint
 
government-Inuvialuit boards, and would be included in the 
benefits of resource development.  In return for surrendering their rights to 344,000 square 
kilometers of land, the Inuvialuit people were guaranteed title to 91,000 square kilometers with 
over 11,000 square kilometers of subsurface rights, and compensation of $152 million to be paid 
by the federal government over 13 years (Frideras and Gagacz, 2001).   
Under this arrangement, the federal government was no longer to play a significant role 
in supporting industry exploration or development in the region, adopting a “hands-off approach 
to future development in the region, leaving emerging frontier energy companies to deal directly 
with both Native land claimants and a vast array of non-industry stakeholders” (Harrison, 2006, 
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p.239).  The federal government partially unloaded its jurisdiction over the resources within the 
region, recognizing that development could be managed more effectively at the local level, and 
by the individuals who stood to be most affected by development, to distant management out of 
Ottawa.  This is in keeping with the stated priorities of the GNWT, which emphasize the 
principles of devolution in relation to resources: “Having northerners take over control of NWT 
energy resources and their development from the federal government is one of our major 
objectives” (Dacks, 1990, p.230).  
Leading up to the negotiation of a Northern Accord in 1988, the oil and gas industry 
expressed concern that continued devolution could lead to consequences unfavourable to their 
interests. “The oil and gas industry was concerned that an increased role for the GNWT (and 
presumably Aboriginal land claimants) in the management of oil and gas development would 
lead to uncertainty in regulatory and management regimes and, perhaps, to policies that were 
harmful to industry interests” (Graham, 1990, p.271).  Yet despite the reservations of the oil and 
gas industry regarding devolution, the Gwich’in Agreement of 1992 and the Sah’tu Agreement 
of 1993 were comprehensive land claims that continued the process, transferring ownership of 
vast areas of NWT land with significant subsurface rights from the Crown to the people who 
lived and depended on the land.  Negotiations have also taken place with the Deh Cho peoples, 
the Dené, and the Chipewyans.  Collectively, the lands covered by these claims and agreements 
comprise the vast majority of the territory.  Such negotiations reflected a shift in governance in 
the North; industry interest and activity had prompted a real and urgent need for issues of land 
management and Aboriginal rights to be considered and resolved.  These negotiations continued 
a transformation in the governance of the territory - from a colonial south-to-north based model, 
lacking Aboriginal participation - to a model that enables Aboriginal communities to participate 
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in decisions of what does or does not happen in terms of development.  This transformation is 
not confined to the Northwest Territories, as “the configuration of public institutions in northern 
Canada (in general) has… been transformed, and along with it, the conditions in which future 
economic development will take place” (Abele et al., 2009, p.225-226). 
 
2.5 Summary 
The process of devolution has reshaped northern political arrangements.  “Since 1985, the issue 
of devolution has assumed a leading role on the political agendas of Canada’s northern 
territories. It has accelerated the prospect of territorial autonomy, even if full provincial status 
under the constitution remains elusive” (Clancy, 1990, p.13).  As the most recent stage of the 
devolution process, land claim negotiations have moulded the current configuration of 
institutions that manage resource development in the Northwest Territories, not only accelerating 
a decentralizing trend in governance, but also creating a decentralized, regionally focused 
approach to regulating resource development.  In the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (a region that 
is legislatively a direct result of devolution), this decentralizing, regionally focused trend 
necessitated the establishment of a unique organizational structure for the management of oil and 
gas resource development.  
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Chapter Three 
Organizational Structure of the ISR Regulatory Regime 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The signing of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement was a major step in the devolution of powers from 
the federal government to territorial and regional levels of government.  In devolving federal 
jurisdiction over key areas of environmental monitoring and resource management, an 
organizational structure was established with the Agreement to fulfill what had been federal roles 
and responsibilities. Understanding this organizational structure is fundamental to an analysis of 
its perceived strengths and weaknesses, and to understanding the impact that devolution has had 
on resource management in the ISR.  
 
3.2 The Organizational Structure Established with the IFA 
Two parallel organizational structures were created with the signing of the Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement.  The first structure is composed of six Community Corporations that collectively 
comprise the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC).  The second structure is the six Hunters and 
Trappers Committees, which combine to form the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC) (Ayles and 
Snow, 2002).  The IGC, in turn, works with several co-management bodies created by the IFA, 
with whom various government agencies and organizations cooperate.  
“The goal of the Inuvialuit negotiators was to maintain their traditional way of life and, at 
the same time, venture into the market economy.  This dual objective was achieved by the 
creation of a business sector [as well as] a wildlife sector” (Anderson and Bone, 2008, p.515), in 
an “attempt to balance the economic interests and environmental concerns of the Inuvialuit” 
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(p.527).  “The relationship between these two management structures… is not explicitly spelled 
out [in the IFA], but there seems to be a deliberate ‘dichotomy or tension’ created under the 
Agreement” (Notzke, 1995, p.192).  
To achieve the goal of “venturing into the market economy,” Inuvialuit participation in 
the northern and national economy, and to guarantee their control over the management and 
administration of the settlement area, section six of the negotiated agreement (IFA) included the 
establishment of a series of Inuvialuit corporations to be “responsible for the management of the 
compensation and benefits received by the Inuvialuit.”  These corporations became significant 
actors in the settlement area, “with [whom] the oil and gas industry, as well as many others… 
have [had] to deal” (Keeping, 1989, p.69). 
 The Inuvialuit Land Corporation, Inuvialuit Development Corporation and Inuvialuit 
Investment Corporation are subsidiary corporations of the IRC, which is the primary corporate 
body with a mandate to: 
 preserve Inuvialuit cultural identity and values within a changing northern society; 
 enable Inuvialuit to be equal and meaningful participants in the northern and national 
economy and society; and 
 protect and preserve Arctic wildlife, environment and biological productivity. 
 
In addition, the Inuvialuit Petroleum Corporation was created in 1985 as an oil development 
and investment company.  In their review of this subsidiary, as well as of the Inuvialuit 
Development and Investment Corporations, Anderson et al. (2004) concluded that “a just 
settlement of land claims has provided the capital for successful entrepreneurship and business 
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development and has contributed to a significant improvement in socioeconomic conditions” in 
the settlement area (p.644). 
The broader IRC exists to “continually improve the economic, social and cultural well-
being of the Inuvialuit through implementation of the IFA and by all other available means” 
(Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, 2007).  The composition of the corporation’s board of directors 
stems from six Inuvialuit community corporations, thus providing a formalized means of 
community participation (Fig. 2).  Playing a central role in the regulatory process, the Inuvialuit 
Land Administration is not a corporation, but is, under the terms of S.6(1a) of the IFA, 
responsible for the management and administration of Inuvialuit land in the ISR. The ILA has 
been a key player in the development of regulatory and administrative matters pertaining to 
Inuvialuit land, in consultation with the oil and gas industry (Keeping, 1989). 
 
Figure 2. IRC Corporate Structure (IRC, 2007) 
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While the establishment of the IRC and its subsidiaries was intended to address the 
economic interests of the Inuvialuit, a means of ensuring that potential development would not 
come at the expense of the environment and wildlife in the region was also required.  In a 1982 
case study (released post-IFA) focusing on oil and gas development in the Beaufort Sea, Brown 
et al. (1985) associated potential environmental impact issues with drilling activities: the 
construction and use of artificial islands; production; transportation of oil and gas; construction 
of support facilities; and an increase in the regional population.  Concerns over the consequences 
of increased shipping and dredging activities stemming from shorter ice-seasons and use of the 
Northwest Passage have also been expressed (Chiperzak et al., 2005).  It was recognized that 
such activities would have potential environmental and social consequences for the Inuvialuit. 
Chiperzak et al. (2005) summarize, “While the economic potential offered by the resurgence of 
[resource-development] activity was generally welcomed, the potential for negative 
environmental effects was of concern to community members who depended on the natural 
resources in the region for food, and whose culture and traditional way of life depended on their 
continued use of the land and sea” (p.99).   
Addressing Inuvialuit interests in environmental and wildlife management within the 
ISR, Section 14 of the IFA provided for the establishment of the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC), 
as well as Hunters and Trappers Committees (HTCs) for the Inuvialuit communities of Aklavik, 
Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, Sachs Harbour and Holman Island.  The HTCs act in an advisory 
capacity to the IGC, and collectively, with each committee electing two representatives, 
comprise (with an additional elected chair) the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC).  The website for 
the IGC explains: “the IGC represents the collective Inuvialuit interest in all matters pertaining to 
the management of wildlife and wildlife habitat in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region.  This 
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responsibility gives the IGC authority for matters related to harvesting rights, renewable resource 
management, and conservation” (Joint Secretariat, 2009).  In addition, the IGC appoints 
Inuvialuit representatives to all of the joint wildlife and environmental co-management 
committees established through the IFA, and the federal government must seek the consent of 
the IGC in the selection of the Chairpersons for these committees.  The IGC is effectively the 
regional representative of hunters, trappers and fisherman in the ISR (Inuvialuit Game Council, 
2003).  The organizational structure of the IGC established under the IFA is outlined in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Inuvialuit Game Council Organizational Structure (Joint Secretariat, 2009). 
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In addition to the corporate bodies, the IGC and HTCs, the IFA established a number of 
co-management bodies (see Fig. 3), which became key actors in the environmental assessment 
and regulatory regime.  Two of these bodies, the Environmental Impact Screening Committee 
(EISC) and the Environmental Impact Review Board (EIRB), are involved in the environmental 
assessment process in the region.  The EISC was established as a board that would operate with 
the participation of the Yukon and the NWT governments, as well as the Government of Canada, 
and the Inuvialuit.  The committee conducts screenings automatically for developments in 
specific areas, or, more broadly, for developments in the ISR for which the Inuvialuit request a 
screening (INAC 1984).  
Project proposals that the EISC determines are likely to have “potential significant 
environmental impacts” (Joint Secretariat, 2009) are then referred to the EIRB, which initiates 
the public review process, whereby the general public in the community most affected by a 
proposed development are invited to express concerns and participate in the review.  Following 
this, the EIRC submits a final report with its recommendations to the federal authority (Joint 
Secretariat, 2009).  This process has the potential to seriously delay a development or project, as 
S.11(31) of the IFA requires the submission of this final report before any licenses or approvals 
allowing development to proceed may be issued (INAC, 1984).  
The EIRB is also the body that actually carries out detailed environmental assessments 
for project proposals, referred by the EISC, and decides how and whether a project should 
proceed, taking into consideration the need for wildlife compensation, mitigation, and remedial 
measures.  As such, the EIRB plays a major role in determining which development projects gain 
approval, as well as the length of time it takes for them to do so.  In this context, Keeping (1989) 
notes that “the scope of the requirement for environmental screening, and review if that should 
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be determined necessary, is generally limited to onshore development, but this is not the case 
where the process is carried out to assess wildlife compensation (p.36).  Beyond the EISC and 
EIRB, the Wildlife Management Advisory Council (WMAC) and Fisheries Joint Management 
Committee (FJMC) co-management bodies were established with the signing of the IFA, and 
conduct research and monitoring programs in their respective areas, and engage in community 
consultation programs to increase public participation in wildlife and fisheries management.  
These four organizations: the EISC, the EIRB, the WMAC, and the FJMC comprise the 
co-management bodies created through the IFA, and play significant roles in the regulatory 
regime of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region.  The EISC and EIRB in particular act as significant 
organizations within the ISR, with the capacity to approve or deny development projects.  The 
Joint Secretariat acts as an administrative liaison between the co-management organizations, as 
well as the IGC.  With an administrative office in Inuvik, the Joint Secretariat serves as an entry 
point for those seeking information relating to the co-management bodies operating in the ISR. 
 
3.3 Roles of the Federal and Territorial Governments 
Despite devolution and the various bodies established through the IFA, the federal 
government remains an important actor, possessing the spending power, the control over 
territorial expenditures, and substantial regulatory authority to affect oil and gas development in 
the North.  The federal government retains considerable control over regulatory decision-
making, with constitutional and fiscal advantages over ISR regulatory bodies, and with greater 
capacity and more regulatory experience (Abele, 2005).  
The ISR must also work cooperatively with the territorial government.  Through the co-
management bodies discussed above, the IGC and a number of government agencies at both the 
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federal and territorial level work together on environmental, wildlife and fisheries management 
in the settlement region.  This was not the case prior to the signing of the Agreement: 
Until the signing of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement in 1984, environmental impact 
assessment in the Western Arctic was conducted by the Federal Environmental and 
Review Office (FEARO)… [which] conducted environmental impact assessments from a 
national perspective. For that reason, local issues, while discussed at public hearings and 
duly noted by numerous boards of inquiry, carried little weight in the final deliberations. 
(Bone 2009, p.530-531).  
 
 The federal government also retains a strong role in the environmental assessment 
process in the ISR, effectively having the power of a veto.  The federal government is still the 
responsible authority for either approving or rejecting project proposals and determinations of 
the EIRB (Binder & Green, 1995).  The Government of Canada’s Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (see Department of Justice 1992) provides the legislative foundation upon which 
the EIRB conducts environmental assessments in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (NWT Board 
Forum ((a)), n.d.).  
Further, co-managed organization membership on both the EISC and EIRB is 
representative of the various levels of government, including the federal government.  Of the 
seven members, three are appointed by the Government of Canada, and three members are 
appointed by the Inuvialuit Game Council.  Of those appointed by the Government of Canada, 
one each is nominated by the federal government, the Yukon Territorial Government, and the 
Government of the Northwest Territories, with the Government of Canada selecting the chair of 
the Board with the consent of the Inuvialuit (EIRB, n.d.).  As such, the federal government is a 
significant participant in the co-managed assessment process, and retains the final say over 
which EIRB recommendations are approved. 
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Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) is the most visible arm of the federal 
government operating in the ISR, playing an important role in “administering economic 
development programs, and acting as a regulatory authority on major mining and infrastructure 
projects” (INAC, 2009b).  INAC is also the body responsible for managing surface activities on 
Crown land “through the administration, regulation, inspection and enforcement of renewable 
and non-renewable resource legislation” (INAC, 2009c).  The Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO) is also an active participant in the co-management of the Beaufort Sea within the 
ISR, most directly through the Fisheries Joint Management Committee (FJMC).  The most 
relevant example of collaboration between these parties is found in the Beaufort Sea Integrated 
Management Planning Initiative (BSIMPI), with the history and work of this initiative having 
been well documented by Chiperzak et al. (2005).   
At the territorial level, the most significant legislation affecting the ISR is the Northwest 
Territories Water Board, which was established under the 1972 Northern Inland Waters Act, and 
was replaced in 1992 with the Northwest Territories Waters Act.  The board “provides for the 
conservation, development and utilization of the water resources of the ISR that will provide the 
optimum benefit of the waters for all Canadians and for the residents of the NWT in particular” 
(NWT Water Board, n.d.). 
 While devolution and the signing of the IFA enhanced the ability of the Inuvialuit people 
to influence and make decisions about what does or does not happen on their traditional land, the 
federal and territorial governments have not been rendered obsolete.  Although the co-
management structure encourages consultation and cooperation between the Inuvialuit and 
government departments, this does not always proceed smoothly, as “the Inuvialuit are often 
skeptical of new government-led initiatives because of past negative experiences” and at times 
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there has been a “perception that ‘government will do what it wants despite what the 
communities say’” (Chiperzak, et al., 2005).  However, despite such skepticism, the structure 
and system of the ISR’s regulatory regime does allow the Inuvialuit a much greater share of 
decision-making power and management responsibilities over their traditional land than they 
exercised previously.  “In particular, the IFA has provided the Inuvialuit with powerful tools 
(including an EA process) to safeguard their interest in wildlife and the environment” (Bone, 
2009, p.535).  Under co-management regimes, the Inuvialuit now share the authority and 
responsibility for assessing development projects in the ISR as well as developments outside the 
ISR that affect wildlife within the region, which are subject to screening and possible 
assessment.  
 
3.4 Integrated Management Initiatives 
In the context of the ISR, initiatives that seek to balance both conservation and development 
interests while pursuing regional and integrated management have largely stemmed from the 
federal government’s 1997 Oceans Act.  The Oceans Act called for a comprehensive and 
integrated approach to the management of oceans and coastal waters, and a “wide application of 
the precautionary approach to the conservation, management and exploitation of marine 
resources” (Chiperzak et al., 2005, p. 101).  The Government of Canada then initiated a two-year 
Oceans Action Plan for 2005-07, which called for (among other initiatives) the identification of 
five priority areas for integrated management, as Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs) 
(Siron et al., 2008). The Beaufort Sea (the marine section of the ISR) was identified as a priority 
area, and a regional governance process was then established to complement national 
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interdepartmental and inter-governmental oceans governance processes and to advance 
integrated ocean management in the Beaufort Sea LOMA. 
The pursuit of these goals led to the formation of the Regional Coordination Committee 
(RCC), the Beaufort Sea Strategic Regional Plan of Action (BStRPA), the Beaufort Sea 
Partnership (BSP) as well as multiple working groups. Through these bodies, multiple 
stakeholders were engaged and cooperated to encourage an integrated approach to oceans 
management in the Beaufort. This governance structure is outlined in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Regional governance structure advancing integrated oceans management in the 
Beaufort Sea LOMA. (Beaufort Sea Partnership, n.d.)  
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3.5 The Regulatory Process 
There are two categories of land within the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, distinguished in S.7 
(1)(a) and (1)(b) of the IFA, between land that affords Inuvialuit ownership of subsurface rights 
and land that is owned by the Inuvialuit, but does not include subsurface rights. “Access that is 
more than casual and individual in nature to Inuvialuit lands requires permission from the 
Inuvialuit.  Accordingly, (the) Inuvialuit Land Administration issues rights to access both 7(1)(a) 
and 7(1)(b) Lands” (ILA, 2005).  Federal and Territorial Agencies are responsible for the 
administration of land-use rights on Crown lands, with input on applications from the Inuvialuit 
(ILA, 2005).  Before a potential developer can enter the regulatory process, they must identify 
the specific area that a proposal seeks to utilize.  
The first stage of the regulatory process is the determination of whether a proposed 
project constitutes a “development,” as defined by the S.2 of the IFA as “(a) any commercial or 
industrial undertaking or venture, including support and transportation facilities relating to the 
extraction of non-renewable resources from the Beaufort Sea other than commercial wildlife 
harvesting,” or “(b) any government project, undertaking or construction whether federal, 
territorial, provincial, municipal, local or by any Crown agency or corporation, except 
government projects within the limits of communities not directly affecting wildlife resources 
outside those limits and except government wildlife enhancement projects” (INAC, 1984). 
Consultation efforts then begin at this point with the relevant advisory bodies and reviewers 
(NWT Board Forum, ((a)), n.d.). 
 If a proposal is determined to constitute a development, the developer will then begin the 
application procedure for required permits/licenses.  For oil and gas developments, the developer 
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will apply to the National Energy Board, which is the primary body responsible for the 
regulation of oil and gas activities in the Beaufort Sea (NEB, 2009).  Water and land use permits 
are also applied for at this stage.  When the land that a proposal seeks to utilize is Inuvialuit 
owned (under section 7 of the IFA), the issuance of a land use permit must come from the ILA, 
which, depending on the activity for which an application is submitted, may require an  
independent review and consultation process (NWT Board Forum ((a)), n.d.) (see Fig. 5). 
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 Figure 5.  ILA Application Review Process (NWT Board Forum, n.d.). 
 
The next stage for a proposed development is an evaluation conducted by the EISC, which is 
required for developments that meet the following criteria (INAC 1997, S.2.1.3.8): 
 Developments that are likely to have a negative environmental impact of consequence to 
the ISR; 
 Developments in the ISR, where Inuvialuit request environmental screening; and 
 Developments where traditional harvest of the Dené and/or Métis may be adversely 
affected (on the request of the Dené, Métis or Inuvialuit). 
It is noted in the INAC report (S. 2.1.3.9, 1997) that “no license or approval will be issued 
permitting any proposed development, until the environmental impact screening and review 
provisions of the IFA are followed.”   The EISC review process is itself multi-layered, requiring 
a potential developer to engage in community consultation before submitting a project 
description to the EISC, in order to identify and deal with local concerns and potential conflicts. 
Binder and Green (1995) provide a thorough description of this process.   
If the Screening Committee finds the proposed development will have no significant 
impact, a project will be permitted to go forward, with or without recommended terms and 
conditions.  The developer and the appropriate regulatory authority are then notified and required 
licenses and permits can be issued.  On the other hand, if the project is determined to be likely to 
have a significant negative impact, the developer and regulatory authority will be notified, and 
the development proposal will be subject to further environmental impact assessment and 
review.  A project will also be subjected to further impact assessment if it is found to have 
“deficiencies of a nature that warrant termination of its consideration by the EISC and the 
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submission of another project description” (Binder & Green, 1995, p.344).  In such instances, the 
proposal will be referred to the Environmental Impact Review Board (EIRB), which is 
responsible for carrying out the assessment (see Fig. 6). 
 
Figure 6, EIRB Screening and Review Process (NWT Board Forum, n.d.).  
 
Once a project has been referred to the EIRB, a new process begins, requiring a public review 
before a panel, which, “on the basis of the evidence and information provided... must 
recommend whether or not the development should proceed, and if so, on what terms and 
conditions” (Binder & Green, 1995, p.345).   Once cleared of the EIRB review process, a 
developer and the regulatory authority can be notified and required permits and licenses are 
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issued. Figure 7 provides a comprehensive diagram of the entire regulatory process described in 
this chapter. 
 
Figure 7. Overview of the ISR Regulatory Process (NWT Board Forum, n.d.).  
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed the organizational structure that was created as a result of 
devolution with the signing of the IFA, and the regulatory process that emerged concurrently for 
impact assessment and development approvals.  Based on this system and process, the following 
chapter examines claims of regulatory and procedural challenges to EA and approvals for oil and 
gas development in the ISR.  
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Chapter Four 
Challenges and Trajectory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With devolution, the institutionalization of new governance arrangements in the NWT 
has brought new challenges.  A number of oil and gas companies have argued that the new 
governance environment of the Territory has resulted in regulatory regimes so complicated or 
problematic as to make the entire region less attractive to potential oil and gas developers 
(Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2008, Dixit et al. 2008, Harrison 2006), thus 
preventing Northern communities opportunities to benefit from development.  Conversely, others 
have argued that the regime is no more complicated than that of other northern jurisdictions 
(INAC, 2005), and that claims to the contrary are exaggerated.  Based on document review and 
key informant interviews, this chapter examines the diverging perspectives, and the most 
commonly identified problems with the ISR’s regulatory system as it relates to oil and gas 
development. Table 2 summarizes this diversity of perspectives: 
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Table 2: Matrix chart on varying perspectives of evaluative bodies. 
BODY FUNCTION PERSPECTIVE 
Government of the Northwest 
Territories (2004/2005 
Environmental Audit) 
Conducts independent review 
every five years to evaluate status 
of NWT environment and 
effectiveness of mitigating 
adverse impacts. 
Neither ISR nor MVRMA 
regimes are overly complex. 
Capacity and timeliness of 
process are areas of concern.  
Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada (2005 McCrank Report).  
Was tasked with identifying ways 
to improve regulatory regimes 
across the Canadian North.  
The number of regulatory bodies 
creates unnecessary complexity. 
Capacity of system(s) is also a 
concern. 
Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers 
Provided McCrank Report with 
submission outlining industry 
perspective.  
The regulatory system in the 
NWT is overly complex and 
time-consuming. 
Alternatives North Non-profit citizen-advocacy 
group in the NWT.  
There are areas requiring 
improvement, but current system 
favours community participation. 
McCrank Report has pro-industry 
bias.  
 
 To date, the most comprehensive evaluations of the regulatory regimes of the NWT are 
found in the NWT Environmental Audit of 2004/2005, and the 2008 Minister’s Report, “Road to 
Improvement” by Neil McCrank, commonly referred to as the McCrank Report.  Although there 
has been a more recent 2010 NWT environmental audit, the ISR was excluded (by request of the 
IRC) from the evaluative component of the audit (INAC, 2011).  While the 2005 Audit focused 
most heavily on the Mackenzie Valley and was legislatively rooted in the MVRMA, the ISR was 
included in the 2005 Audit as per the Audit Terms of Reference (INAC, 2005) and, as such, 
made note of when qualities of the ISR were found to be unique or to differ from that of the 
MVRMA, but failed to provide depth in their broad analysis of the NWT.  The McCrank Report, 
on the other hand, specified that while it “include(d) an examination of the common themes 
across the ISR, the focus (was) on the regulatory system covered by the MVRMA” (McCrank, 
2008, p.2).  As such, these sources are useful in identifying regulatory themes, issues and 
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challenges common throughout the territory, but do not provide information specific to the ISR, 
and are useful only as a starting point for an understanding of the regulatory process.  
 
4.2 Timeliness and Capacity  
The 2005 Audit defined the major components of the two regulatory regimes of the NWT (ISR 
and the MVRMA) as including: “land use planning, regulation (i.e., issuance and enforcement of 
permits and licenses) and environmental impact assessment” (INAC, 2005, p.1). Examining 
these components within the ISR and the broader NWT, the Audit found both positive and 
negative qualities.  While it credited the ISR as having been fairly successful in the development 
and implementation of land use planning processes, their findings expressed concern over issues 
of capacity and timeliness in both the regulation (p.2) and environmental impact assessment 
components (p.3) of the regimes.   
Specifically, the authors reported that “concerns were expressed about the timeliness of 
EIA processes” and “that the number and nature of proposals being referred to Environmental 
Assessment was inappropriate” (p.4).  The Audit did not, however, specify if such concerns 
included the EIA process within the ISR in addition to the broader Mackenzie Valley, or if they 
were exclusive to the Mackenzie Valley.  But, such concerns are consistent with themes 
discussed in the McCrank Report (p. 6, 11, 12, 23-24), as well as in a submission to the McCrank 
Report from the oil industry (CAPP, 2008, p.11).   
 The McCrank Report differed in focus from the NWT Environmental Audit, as its 
primary purpose was to seek ways of improving regulatory regimes across the North (p.1), while 
the Audit sought to evaluate the status of the environment within the NWT, as well as the 
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effectiveness of efforts at minimizing significant adverse impacts (INAC 2005 p.1).  In 
conducting the review, McCrank spent a total of 55 days consulting Aboriginal organizations, 
land claim signatories, regulatory bodies, government departments (both territorial and federal), 
municipal governments, industry (both individual companies and associations), environmental 
organizations, politicians and individuals, receiving and reviewing oral and written submissions, 
sent out questionnaires and held roundtable discussions (p.4).  The outcome, like the 2005 Audit, 
found both strengths and weaknesses in the regulatory systems of the territory, but was 
somewhat harsher in its conclusions.  The McCrank Report presented a list of objectives that 
would characterize an ideal regulatory system.  It qualified that the list was “not meant to be 
exhaustive and it by no means suggest(ed) that all regulatory bodies achieve(d) all of these, all 
the time. (Rather), it (was) meant to act as a foundation to recommend improvements to the 
current system in the North, particularly in the NWT” (p.5).  Of the eleven listed objectives of a 
model regulatory system, McCrank found that seven of the objectives were consistently not 
being met in the current system, and two objectives, including the need for the system to have 
sufficient capacity and for it to be understandable could not be met at all within the current 
structure.  
 A lack of sufficient capacity and a time-consuming approval process are common 
critiques made against the regulatory system of the ISR.  If such concerns are valid, the question 
becomes whether or not these problems can be considered justifiable consequences of a 
regulatory approach that seeks to balance the need for economic development with social and 
environmental needs, and the answer is of course dependent upon one’s perspective.  Richard 
Binder of the IGC, for example, described the organization’s position relating to a specific 
project, and his description articulates this balancing act:  
45 
 
 
“The IGC is not opposed to development in general nor the Mackenzie Gas Project in 
particular.  It is viewed as a major development, which, if it proceeds, must be carefully 
mitigated to the greatest extent possible to ensure that there are minimal negative effects 
to wildlife, the environment and traditional lifestyle” (Anderson, Dana & Meis-Mason., 
2008, p.160).  
 
With strong industry interest and the multitude of governmental and organizational 
actors, as well as a strong emphasis on community participation in decision-making, a variety of 
perspectives are found in the ISR, with some finding the issue of capacity (resulting in time-
constraints) more reasonable than others.  Binder and Green, in their description of the ISR 
screening and review process, do identify as a central challenge for the process, “the continuing 
need to expeditiously deal with any new application,” but have mostly praise for the system 
(1995, p.345).  
Given the level to which community consultation is encouraged and indeed required 
under the IFA for proposed developments, timeliness in the ISR may be an unavoidable 
challenge for potential developers.  This was hinted in the findings of the 2005 NWT Audit: 
“What is unique is the extent and proactive nature of community involvement, and the degree to 
which public input can influence the process” (p.2), but the report conceded that there existed 
room for improvement in the timeliness of community consultation and involvement.  
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4.3 Complexity  
The McCrank Report argued that “the proliferation of regulatory bodies creates complexity and 
lack of understanding, as well as… extreme difficulty (in) developing the proper capacity of 
these bodies… The complexity of the system speaks for itself.  The number of boards and 
regulatory authorities are a result of the comprehensive land claim agreements… The 
(regulatory) system was created to meet multiple objectives, but, in doing so a very complex 
regulatory system, that is not very well understood, was developed” (p.11-12).   
Once again, criticism is being made in general terms regarding the regulatory system in 
the territory as a whole, without specifying the extent to which such concerns do or do not extend 
to the ISR.  Such concerns echoed those voiced by the petroleum industry in their submission to 
the McCrank Report (CAPP, 2008), in which they argued that “Environmental assessment and 
regulatory authorization systems north of 60 are unnecessarily complicated, in that the 
complexity does not result in better outcomes.  This places a heavy duty on operators, and can be 
a challenge for regulators, few of whom have a working understanding of the system as a whole” 
(p.7).  CAPP also argued that the system was poorly suited to resource development activities.  It 
is unclear which regime is being referred to, but given the high level of interest in oil and gas 
development within the Beaufort Sea, we can reasonably assume the criticism was directed at 
least partly towards the ISR:  
“Even simple activities typically require a number of authorizations from multiple 
authorities, with each authorization requiring the completion of environmental 
assessment… From a resource management perspective, the degree of regulatory 
complexity is inconsistent with the stage of development of northern hydrocarbon basins” 
(p.10).   
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In contrast to the findings of the McCrank Report and the CAPP submission, the NWT 
Environmental Audit found neither regime to be particularly complex, arguing that “the 
regulatory regimes of the NWT are not substantially more complex than those of other 
jurisdictions” (p.2), but the Audit failed to provide a reasonable explanation of why complexity 
was often cited as a regulatory challenge by the oil and gas industry.  
Interestingly, claims of over-complexity predate the current regime in the region. In their 
1982 case study of oil and gas development in the Beaufort Sea, Brown et al. (1985) reported 
that “a major problem facing both Beaufort Sea developers and communities is the plethora of 
government departments and agencies involved in planning and regulating activities in the area 
and the ad hoc nature with which these have emerged” (p.47).  Additionally, they claimed: 
“When faced with the existing organizational complexity, it is not surprising that the desirability 
of a so-called ‘single window’ approach to planning and regulation in the Beaufort Sea is raised” 
(p.48). 
While the alleged complexity of the regime(s) seems to be a broadly consistent claim 
(CAPP, 2008, INAC, 2005, McCrank, 2008, Dixit et al., 2008, Harrison, 2006), specific 
examples to validate such claims, as well as suggestions on simplifying problematic areas are 
seldom provided.  In their response to the McCrank Report, representatives of the Gwich’in Land 
Use Planning Board and the Gwich’in Renewable Resources Board (of the Mackenzie Valley 
region of the territory) illustrated this point: 
“Although the system has been criticized as being complex there is very little detail 
offered about how to make the system simpler for developers to navigate.  The McCrank 
Report focuses on co-management boards while simply acknowledging government 
regulation and decisions need to be coordinated… The assertion of complexity is linked 
to the creation of 20+ co-management boards but it is not put in the context of an 
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example to show which, or how many, of these a developer can expect to deal with for 
any one project” (Charlie & Simpson, 2008).  
 
The non-profit group Alternatives North (2008) went a step further in their response to 
the report, accusing it of having a pro-industry bias, arguing that the “review seems to be based 
in the unreasonable, yet persistently held views of some private sector developers that refuse to 
recognize and adapt to the governance and regulatory system that has evolved in the Northwest 
Territories as a result of constitutionally entrenched land claims agreements.” The group goes on 
to explain that “while we acknowledge that there may be some areas of the environmental 
management system that require real improvement, Mr. McCrank’s assignment appears to be one 
of attempting to tip the balance of power in favour of the corporate sector.” 
Thoroughly investigating common criticisms regarding the alleged complexity of the 
system would require a comparative approach, beyond the scope of this thesis.  Having described 
the overall process, however, the regulatory regime established with the IFA seems relatively 
straightforward and understandable.  The number of organizational and governmental actors 
affecting the regulatory system is impressive, but the result of having multiple actors affecting 
the regime has not necessarily been poor or inefficient resource management.  Indeed, at least in 
some areas, it has been argued that “while the numerous committees and boards established by 
the IFA may initially seem cumbersome, there in fact has been increased expediency and cost-
effectiveness of fish and wildlife management decision-making” (Bailey et al., 1995, p. 15).  
It is possible that allegations of unnecessary complexity relate more to the consequences 
of devolution with the existence of two separate regulatory regimes and multiple land claims in 
the NWT, and have less to do with the regime of the ISR itself.  In a summary of land 
management issues in the NWT, Bastedo (2010) argues that from a regulatory perspective, the 
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multiple land claim settlements found in the NWT make it a more complicated place than its 
territorial neighbours:  
From a land management perspective, life is simpler in the Yukon where, unlike the 
NWT, several regional claim settlements fall under an umbrella agreement, creating 
fewer boards with a more unified mandate. A much broader devolution of resource 
management powers in the Yukon further enhances clarity over roles and certainty over 
land ownership. The same could be said for Nunavut where a single region-wide claim 
settlement created a simpler system with greater operational certainty. In the NWT, the 
settlement of four independent claims – with three more waiting in the wings – created a 
proliferation of boards and processes that contribute to a relatively more complex 
regulatory regime. Future devolution of greater resource management powers may add 
another layer of complexity to this regime (p.11).  
 
It is expected that the licensing and approval of projects overlapping the regulatory 
regime of the ISR and that of the MVRMA would be much more time-consuming and complex 
than a development proposal that were contained to a single regime.  The fact that the ISR is 
often included, but rarely specifically discussed in evaluations and criticisms of environmental 
assessment and regulatory processes in the NWT suggests the possibility that challenges facing 
the oil and gas regulatory regime of the MVRMA are being generalized for the territory as a 
whole, including the ISR.  This possibility was suggested during interviews. One federal 
regulator summarized the present situation this way: 
I think, unfairly, that the ISR gets tarred with the same brush, if you like. The regime that 
was set up there, of all the northern land claims – maybe I’d even say all of the modern 
land claims – I really like the IFA the best. For the basic reason that it is less detailed than 
any of the others. Because these land claims become constitutional documents… 
changing them is extremely difficult. It took them I think over ten years to amend the 
IFA, and this is with the parties agreeing to the amendments… it wasn’t contentious 
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particularly. And the regime that’s described there is far, far, far simpler than that created 
in the MVRMA and through the Acts and such. And as a result, it can improve with time 
– it can change over time. (Federal Regulator B, personal communication, 2011).  
 
 Potential improvement or evolution within the regulatory system of the ISR is further 
suggested by previous evaluations.  In the conclusions of the 2005 NWT Environmental Audit, 
for example, the authors reported that “the MVRMA and ISR regulatory regimes are, to varying 
degrees, relatively new and they continue to evolve as additional operational experience is 
obtained.  The ISR process has had much more time to evolve than that of the Mackenzie Valley. 
As such, it has progressed beyond many of the initial challenges, frustrations and uncertainty of 
process being faced in parts of the Mackenzie Valley” (INAC, 2005, p.S-2).  
This suggests that the ISR is recognized as having a more understandable and less 
complex regulatory process than that of the MVRMA.  This is further validated by CAPP, who 
specified that “there is greater clarity and familiarity around the processes in the ISR, both 
among regulators and proponents” and that “there has been a substantial increase (in expediency) 
in processing time for applications over the past few seasons” (2008, p.16).  
It would be too sweeping to categorically deny arguments of complexity made against the 
regulatory process in the ISR, but based on document analysis, and having reviewed the process 
in the previous chapter, it is a reasonable assumption that allegations of the system being overly 
complex have been exaggerated, or may be the result of first impressions, rather than actual 
experience.  This is suggested in the comments of a federal regulator, who explained, “I do know 
that [to] people, when they’re coming into the ISR, it is initially very confusing… But once you 
actually sit down, and take half a day, even, and have someone explain it to you, it isn’t that 
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difficult. I think people just get frustrated quite easily, because it isn’t what they’re used to” 
(Federal Regulator C, Personal Communication, 2011).  
 
4.4 Duplication of Efforts 
An additional factor that may contribute to the perception that the regime is overly complex is 
the continued role of the CEAA in the environmental assessment process.  CEAA provides the 
legislative foundation upon which the IFA’s EIRB conducts environmental assessments in the 
ISR (NWT Board Forum, n.d.).  Ensuring that a development meets its requirements remains a 
responsibility of CEAA, despite the screening and review process (EIRB and EISC) established 
with the IFA.  Currently, efforts between the Inuvialuit and the federal Agency to deal with 
overlap and/or duplication in EA processes are made primarily on a case-by-case basis (Beaufort 
Sea Strategic Regional Plan of Action, 2008, p.17), and efforts to harmonize the two processes 
have been discussed (Regulatory Roadmaps Project, 2001). 
To avoid potential duplication of efforts, CEAA and the EIRB signed a memorandum of 
understanding in 2000, outlining the terms and process of CEAA panel review substitutions in 
place of EIRB environmental assessments, as may be requested by the EIRB (CEAA, 2000). 
Thus far, such a substitution has taken place once with the proposed Inuvik to Tuktoyaktuk 
Highway project (CEAA, 2010), reflecting the comments of a federal regulator (A) that “There is 
potential for a duplication of reviews happening, but usually CEAA has deferred to the Inuvialuit 
processes” (Personal Communication, 2011).  The perspectives of regulators regarding the 
feasibility, or desirability of simplifying or harmonizing these systems are varied.  As one 
regulator explained: “Anything that can simplify the administrative complexity, while still 
delivering an open, transparent public process to engage the public in these kinds of decisions is 
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desirable, and there’s probably lots of ways to do it” (Federal Regulator A, Personal 
Communication, 2011).  Conversely, on the prospect of eliminating CEAA’s presence in the 
ISR, the issue of capacity arose when another federal regulator argued; “people are always 
saying that we need to get rid of CEAA in the ISR, but in my opinion that would be kind of 
disastrous.  The EISC does not have the capacity, or ability, to run an entire environmental 
assessment” (Federal Regulator C, Personal Communication, 2011).  
  
4.5 Cumulative Effects 
Beyond possible duplication of efforts, an added factor that has been cited by both regulators and 
developers as a regulatory challenge in the Beaufort Sea region is the project-by-project nature of 
environmental assessments in the region.  Although devolution has unquestionably enhanced the 
ability of northern communities to influence oil and gas development in the ISR, it could be 
argued that the decentralized nature of the IFA’s institutional organization, in the face of multi-
jurisdictional ecosystems and in relation to other regulatory regimes (MVRMA), has reached a 
point where regional planning and the consideration of cumulative effects must be considered.  
The 2005 NWT Environmental Audit warned that “a Cumulative Impact Monitoring 
Program (CIMP) has not yet been implemented and limited regional/territorial environmental 
baseline and cumulative impact data were available to decision makers” (INAC, 2005, p.5). 
Individuals with knowledge of the region echo this concern.  One federal regulator cited the lack 
of cumulative effects as the key challenge for environmental assessment in the region: “We can 
review individual projects quite well.  We can do a good job on that.  But when you don’t have a 
regional context with these projects, you don’t know what their contribution is to regional 
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effects, to cumulative effects” (Federal Regulator B, Personal Communication, 2011).  A 
representative of a northern non-governmental organization further explained; 
 “The requirements for EA don’t require a real cumulative effects analysis [because] it’s 
all project based, which leads to potentially a lot of duplication.  Especially when you are 
going to have similar assessments done for adjacent parcels in the offshore... [separate 
developers] would each be doing an EA, and that means a lot of duplication, but without 
a really robust Cumulative Effects Assessment.  So obviously we think a regional 
approach would be much better” (Personal Communication, 2010). 
 
In addition, the resurgence of interest and activity among oil and gas developers in the 
Beaufort Sea, and the potential construction of the Mackenzie Valley Gas Pipeline have raised 
concern among some Inuvialuit regarding the potential consequences of such projects on local 
ecosystems and wildlife (Elliot and Spek, 2004).  Such concerns have served to heighten the 
need for a more regional and cumulative approach to resource management in the ISR, and have 
in turn led to several initiatives, largely focused on integrated planning and management.  
To date, the ongoing work of the RCC, BSP and affiliated committees and initiatives 
have been well documented (Chiperzak et al., 2005, Siron et al., 2008), and reflect the growing 
recognition in the North of a need for integrated and cooperative management of resource 
conservation and development.  The Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment (BREA), for 
example, is an initiative intended to engage multiple stakeholders through the sponsorship of 
regional environmental and socio-economic research, to “remain relevant to longer-term 
potential development in the Beaufort by providing a scientific and socio-economic baseline for 
the Beaufort Sea” (INAC, 2010).  
Responding to the limitations of the existing regulatory regime, the text of the BSP’s 
Strategic Regional Plan of Action (BSStRPA)  acknowledged some of the criticisms directed 
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towards the regulatory regime of the ISR: “While the existing regulatory framework is generally 
comprehensive, it is relatively complicated, and individual project reviews are inefficient and 
time consuming” (2008, p.16).  There is some doubt, however, that these integrated initiatives 
will have the capacity to resolve a number of issues that have been identified as challenges.  As 
one federal regulator argued: “Integrated management seems to be dead, or slumbering at least. 
They haven’t been funded, so that’s not going to go very far. BREA’s turned into a science-
funding program. So you’re still not tackling the regional issues” (Federal Regulator B, Personal 
Communication, 2011).  An additional individual, discussing BSStRPA and BREA added; 
“Everybody’s heart has been in the right place, trying to improve the state of science and 
improve the availability of information that’s relevant to good EA, but they’ve tended to be 
under-resourced, and nobody would really take ownership… [They are] not so much about 
regional EA, [but are rather] about data that could support regional EA” (Federal Regulator A, 
Personal Communication, 2011).  Further, a northern board/agency representative saw a lack of 
funding as a limitation on the potential of regional initiatives:  
We’ve been at it for a long time, constantly trying to push forward and press [upon] 
government that there needs to be a lot more science done in terms of the offshore. So 
that goes back quite a while now and was really highlighted in the Strategic Regional 
Plan of Action… and these are …areas that there either is a lack of knowledge, or [there] 
is an issue raised by [a] community. So out of BSStRPA of course BREA happened, but 
there’s still potential for a lot of gaps, or not enough money to fill those gaps. BREA 
sounds like a lot of money, but we’re discovering it’s not enough to do all the research. 
[The potential for] oil spills [represents] a big factor. And that’s probably going to cost 
twenty, thirty million dollars, which is way beyond the capability of BREA to do. 
(Northern Board/Agency Representative A, Personal Communication, 2011).  
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What remains unclear is the degree to which the regulatory regime of the ISR, with its 
decentralized nature, is compatible with initiatives emphasizing more regional approaches to 
planning for oil and gas development, assuming that such initiatives stood to improve 
environmental assessment and resolve perceived challenges.  Given the constitutionally 
entrenched status of land claims agreements, any changes to the regulatory system would have to 
respect the process created with the signing of the IFA, and would necessarily be undertaken 
with the support of the Inuvialuit communities: 
The way you reconcile [the decentralized nature of the ISR and regional initiatives], I 
guess, really is that your approach to these initiatives is community based. To make it 
successful you have to have the buy-in to the participation of communities, the HTO’s, 
the co-management bodies, the relevant government departments, so if you look at the 
membership list of the BStRPA or BREA, they’re all basically the same, and have the 
same representation in many respects. And if you go through a big list, that sounds like a 
very cumbersome way of doing things, but it’s actually not. It’s a fairly small community 
there, and it’s not that big a deal to do it that way. There aren’t a lot of axes to grind there 
(Federal Regulator B, Personal Communication, 2011).  
 
In contrast, another individual saw administrative complexity as a major barrier to regional or 
strategic EA in the Beaufort: 
 
When we talk about regional or strategic EA, particularly in the North, we quickly run 
into land-use planning kind of concepts. And a lot of my federal colleagues, and a lot of 
people who design federal EA, really don’t trust provinces and territories to do land-use 
planning in a way that protects the environment. It’s almost a chauvinist kind of attitude, 
but it’s very strong. And so they really see value to having the feds involved, to kind of 
second-guess or oversee regional or land claim or provincial land-use planning. And so 
regional EA is about setting a vision for future development, ideally about having some 
kinds of thresholds which very rarely work out in practice. So you run, right away, smack 
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into a constitutional issue over who is calling the shots on whose land. (Federal Regulator 
A, Personal Communication, 2011).  
 
 It becomes further evident that there is a considerable diversity of views on what the 
perceived challenges are to the regulatory system of the ISR both as it currently functions, and 
also going forward.   Although the IFA, as a constitutionally protected agreement, sets the 
foundation for the regulatory process and environmental assessment in the ISR, recent regional 
and integrated planning initiatives illustrate that the regime is hardly static or non-changing.  
 
4.6 Summary  
Chapter four has reviewed themes commonly identified as challenges for oil and gas 
development approvals in the ISR, and has explored potential explanations for areas where such 
themes are being exaggerated. As devolution unfolds and resource development proceeds, new 
challenges and opportunities for oil and gas development in the ISR are likely to emerge.  In 
spite of uncertainties and a diversity of views on perceived challenges, it has been suggested that 
the regulatory process is improving with time and experience. There does seem to be consensus 
that regional initiatives have the potential to strengthen the regulatory process, provided that 
these initiatives are adequately funded, actively engage the communities of the ISR, and build 
upon, rather than attempt to alter the institutional organization created through the IFA. 
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Chapter 5  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Using the lens of devolution, the purpose of this paper was to identify and connect existing 
knowledge on a subject that has arguably been neglected, and to provide a more comprehensive 
overview of the regulatory regime of the ISR than has previously been available.  Understanding 
that the ISR’s regulatory regime is a product of the ongoing process of devolution allowed the 
research to situate the ISR in space and time, providing context and understanding of how the 
ISR’s regulatory regime has emerged and the rationale behind its organizational design. 
Indeed, the experience of this thesis suggests that devolution is a crucial factor that must be 
considered by researchers of EA or SEA in political environments where there is an Indigenous 
element.  This is validated by Cheema and Rondinelli (2007): “Any assessment of 
decentralization of natural resource control must take into account the current context that has 
given rise to many of the initiatives to restore control to the local populations” (p.294).  
In order to provide needed context, the thesis offered an historical summary of devolution 
and political history in the NWT, followed by the identification and a description of the key 
actors and organizations involved in the regime that emerged with the establishment of the ISR.  
The thesis then provided a description of the process by which potential developers seek 
approval for projects, particularly as it affects the oil and gas industry.  Finally, the thesis 
identified and examined the most common criticisms made against the regulatory process, 
exploring potential explanations for perceived challenges to oil and gas development and 
approvals, and whether these challenges were exacerbated or diminished by devolution.  
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In large part, the thesis sought not so much to fill a specific knowledge gap, but to 
connect existing knowledge on the subject of regulatory challenges in the Mackenzie Delta and 
Beaufort Sea Region, and to identify those areas where gaps exist.  The introduction stated the 
intention of the thesis to respond to sets of questions relating to the evolution of and current 
structure of the ISR regulatory regime, as well as those relating to current regulatory challenges 
and limitations, and the impact of devolution.  Chapters two and three provided the necessary 
background information and summary of the ISR’s regulatory process, respectively, which 
allowed chapter four to respond to these questions, and to provide an examination of the 
common criticisms against the regime.  This was accomplished by investigating the available 
literature on the regulatory system, particularly as it affects oil and gas development.  Interviews 
with individuals who had knowledge and experience with regulatory policy and EA in the ISR 
were conducted to provide further insight into challenges and opportunities going forward, and 
also to clarify where alleged problems were being exaggerated, and where they were fully or at 
least partially valid.  
This has allowed the identification of several knowledge gaps.  The related allegations 
that the regulatory process places unnecessary time-constraints on developers and has a limited 
capacity to deal with high volumes of applications for development seem to be valid, although it 
has been suggested that the process is becoming more expedient with time (Bailey et al. 1995, 
CAPP 2008, INAC 2005).  This, however, has not been proven.  Insight would be gained by 
testing this claim, ideally through an evaluation of the number of, and timeliness of individual 
EIRB project reviews on a year-by-year basis.  Currently, only partial information on past review 
projects conducted by the EIRB can be found on the organization’s website.  The information 
provided is limited, however, as it does not include timelines associated with the research and 
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assessment conducted by the proponent, although these are likely to be factored in when 
criticisms of the timeliness of the process are leveled against it.  Research that explored the 
expediency of this process over time (whether it improves, is stagnant, or declines with 
experience) would be enhanced by interviewing individuals associated with specific projects, 
ideally dating back to the signing of the Agreement.  
 An additional area requiring further, comparative-based research relates to claims of the 
ISR’s organizational and procedural complexity, regularly identified as a challenge to oil and gas 
development and approval in the region.  As responsibilities were devolved to the regional level, 
a great number of committees and boards, organizations, and community corporations were 
created to work with remaining government agencies to affect the regulatory process in the ISR. 
At first impression, this multitude of actors and stakeholders with varying roles and 
responsibilities may lead one to conclude that the regulatory process of the ISR is highly 
complex.  However, a more detailed examination of the roles and responsibilities of these actors 
and an understanding of the actual review and screening process reveal a relatively 
straightforward and understandable system.  “Many of the more negative assessments of 
cooperative management (under the IFA) appeared to come from individuals unfamiliar with the 
processes at work or the issues under consideration” (Bailey et al., p.14-15).  
Through examining the reports and evaluations that have emerged regarding the 
regulatory systems of the NWT, and by interviewing federal regulators with knowledge of both 
the MVRMA and the ISR regimes, it seems that claims of complexity may be at least partially 
related to the existence of two separate regulatory systems in the NWT.  Given that the most 
comprehensive research to date on environmental assessment and regulatory policy in the NWT 
has largely focused on the regime of the MVRMA (CAPP, 2008, McCrank, 2008, INAC, 2005), 
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and further suggested by interviews, it seems that problems and challenges facing the system of 
the MVRMA are being generalized, often unfairly, for the entire territory including the ISR. 
While such generalizations may or may not be accurate for the ISR, they overlook possible 
exceptions or possible strengths to the ISR’s regulatory regime.  Currently, there is an 
insufficient amount of research available to properly analyze how the ISR performs in 
comparison to that of other Northern jurisdictions.  Although this thesis was able to recognize 
that problems with the MVRMA are being generalized to apply to the ISR, conclusively 
assessing the validity of such claims (capacity and complexity in particular) is an objective that 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis, as such an objective would require a much more detailed 
investigation of the regulatory regimes of the MVRMA and those of other northern jurisdictions, 
thereby diverging in focus from the ISR regime.  Insight into both criticisms (complexity and 
capacity) would be gained through a comparative analysis of the ISR regulatory regime with 
comparatively similar regulatory systems, and in particular those regulatory systems in northern 
jurisdictions where the oil and gas industry is present.  
An additional issue that was identified by the thesis as a possible challenge to the 
environmental assessment process within the ISR’s regulatory process was a potential 
duplication of efforts.  The continued presence of the CEAA in the ISR’s EA process creates the 
potential for duplication of efforts/potential overlap of responsibilities with the EIRB.  Opinions 
expressed during interviews were mixed, however, regarding the degree to which the presence of 
two separate EA processes created problems or tension, and were varied in the perceived 
desirability of eliminating CEAA in the region, as well as the need for harmonization between 
the separate EA systems.  Thus far, the existence of two EA processes applying in the ISR does 
not seem to have contributed to organizational complexity, as the two systems work 
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cooperatively so long as CEAA’s requirements are being met by the Inuvialuit EA process 
(Federal Regulator A, personal communication, 2011).  
It became apparent through research and interviews that the current regime does an 
inadequate job of managing data and research, and the lack of cumulative impact monitoring 
should be a priority area for regulators and policy developers seeking ways to improve the 
regime, as the lack of cumulative data was consistently cited as a challenge by regulators.  While 
recent initiatives emphasizing integrated planning and management have responded to this 
problem, there is concern that current efforts are limited and underfunded, and may be 
inadequate to meet future challenges that increased oil and gas development in the Beaufort 
could present.  
Beyond the identification of  challenges and knowledge gaps, what has been provided 
with this thesis is an overview of the ISR’s regulatory regime: the history and motivation for the 
regime that emerged with the signing of the IFA; the identification of the key actors and 
organizations with an explanation of their roles and responsibilities; a description of how the 
regulatory process actually works; and document review and interviews to allow the 
identification of perceived challenges to oil and gas development within the regulatory system of 
the ISR, with attention to possible explanations for problems or limitations.  Such an overview 
may prove invaluable to individuals approaching the topic who would otherwise be forced to 
seek out multiple, disaggregated sources for information.  Given that much of the evaluative 
material available for this research generalized the regulatory regimes of the MVRMA and the 
ISR with little distinction, this thesis represents one of the most comprehensive regulatory 
overviews with specific focus on the ISR to date.  
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Further, the focus on the impact of devolution specific to the ISR contributes to the 
growing body of literature on devolution and northern governance.  Notable academics have 
made significant contributions to devolution literature in the Canadian context (Abele, 2007, 
Funston, 2007, White, 2002, 2008, Wilson, 2005), but to date, such research has not focused on 
the ISR.  There is no question that devolution has profoundly reconfigured governance 
arrangements in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, and as such, it provides a unique example for 
scholarly discussion of federalism, multi-tiered governance and devolution. The ISR fits 
Wilson’s (2005) framework of Nested Federalism, in which a separate entity is geographically 
and politically positioned within a larger “host” region (in this case the NWT).  This has been to 
the advantage of the Inuvialuit in promoting and protecting their interests relating to oil and gas 
development and resource management, and supports White’s argument (2005) that northern 
land-claims boards provide an effective vehicle for enhancing Aboriginal participation and 
decision-making capacity.  For the broader NWT, the ISR’s “host” region, the long-term 
consequences of continued devolution are unknown, but Abele et al. (2009) suggest the 
possibility that multiple Aboriginal institutions will gradually become the primary medium 
through which people living within their jurisdictions will participate politically.  The authors 
quote former NWT premier George Braden, who suggested that such institutions would 
gradually undermine the territorial government, as “the western North will become a balkanized 
collection of Aboriginal institutions competing with territorial public governments that do not 
have the jurisdiction or financial resources to effectively govern in the interest of all territorial 
residents” (p.574). 
Within the ISR, we are able to make several observations using the lens of devolution. 
The process of devolution has had both positive and negative consequences for the Inuvialuit 
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regulatory regime: On the positive side, it has unquestionably strengthened the ability of the 
Inuvialuit to influence the decision-making process, and we need look no further than the third 
chapter’s review of the institutional organization and approvals process of the ISR to gain a 
sense of the central Inuvialuit role in consultation and co-management. The Inuvialuit role in the 
regulatory process supports the argument that decentralization favours political participation 
(Brinkerhoff et al., 2007, Oates, 1972, Weller, 1990, White, 2005). Further, the economic 
performance of the ISR (through the IRC) has been impressive, with accumulating capital 
(Nguyen, 2009), and continuing profits and distribution payments to beneficiaries in spite of the 
economic downturn of recent years (IRC, 2011).  This success supports a connection between the 
increased decision-making capacity of communities and economic development (Ascher, 2007, 
Azfar, et al., 2004, Calliou, 2008).  
On the negative side, possible capacity limitations within the ISR’s regulatory regime 
could be interpreted to support the argument that decentralization leads to reduced overall 
capacity for regional governments (McGuire et al, 1994, Treisman, 2007). If the ISR’s capacity 
were proven to increase with time and experience (Bailey et al. 1995, CAPP 2008, INAC 2005), 
however, this assertion would be difficult to maintain in the case of the ISR.  Indeed, there was 
little to validate arguments against devolution within the ISR.  On complexity, devolution does 
not seem to be a contributing factor inside of the ISR.  In the broader NWT, however, it could be 
argued that the multiple land claims and separate regulatory regimes have produced a 
complicated regulatory environment that creates the perception of complexity in the territorial 
whole, including the ISR.  In the MVRMA, land claims continue to be negotiated, and the 
uncertain status of these areas contribute to the overall complexity of the region (Bastedo, 2010). 
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In this sense, it is not the process of devolution itself that contributes to complexity, but rather 
that the process is incomplete.  
The Inuvialuit experience with devolution suggests a number of observations about some 
of the factors that shape governance in devolved political arenas.  The ISR benefits from having 
a settled land-claim and a relatively homogenous population.  The cooperative interaction 
between the multiple actors of the ISR, through devolved levels of government, empowered 
community corporations and co-management groups defies the argument that devolution 
contributes to administrative complexity or divisions within the community (Diamond, 1999, 
Hutchcroft, 2001).  In regions with multiple ethnicities and a looser sense of community identity, 
“the capacity of community groups to manage natural resources responsibly is challenged by 
conflict over definition of membership in the community” (Asher, 2007, p.296).  This does not 
seem to be an issue in the ISR, where we are told that “It’s a fairly small community… There 
aren’t a lot of axes to grind [and] it’s a fairly colloquial atmosphere” (Federal Regulator B, 
Personal Communication, 2011). The Inuvialuit example suggests that a defined identity within a 
specified territory provides a strong foundation for the devolution of powers.  
Having acquired substantial economic and political control in the Mackenzie Delta and 
Beaufort Sea Region, however, the challenge of cumulative effects monitoring (or the current 
lack thereof) raises the possibility that there may be a practical limit to devolved responsibilities 
for oil and gas regulatory management in the ISR, and it remains to be seen how the 
decentralized nature of the ISR will fit into broader regional initiatives.  
Although Treisman (2007) notes the lack of identifiable conditions that make devolution 
desirable, literature that focuses on the theoretical aspects of devolution too often assumes that 
the circumstances of diverse regions will be more or less similar, and that the outcomes (positive 
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or negative) of devolved powers and responsibilities will generally be the same. Literature 
discussing devolution theory regularly focusses on the experiences of populated, southern 
nations or regions (Ascher 2007, Brinkerhoff et al., 2007, Grindle, 2007, Lieberman & Shaw, 
2000, Mooney, Scott & Williams, 2006, Oates, 1972, 1999). Such literature is useful in 
providing a roadmap to our understanding of the conflicting views regarding the perceived 
desirability or flaws with policies emphasizing devolution, but the unique circumstances and 
political arrangements of the Canadian North must be recognized when devolution theory is 
being discussed.  The argument that devolution can foster increased responsiveness in 
government services, for example, takes on much greater significance when one considers the 
sheer distance between administrative centres (such as Yellowknife or Ottawa) and small, 
Northern communities such as Aklavik, Tuktoyaktuk or Inuvik.  When Brinkerhoff et al. (2007) 
described the spatial dimension of devolution theory, it is unlikely that they imagined the 
distance from the centre to the local level as covering a distance of thousands of kilometers.  In 
the Canadian Territories, there is also an added layer of devolution, in which both the territorial 
governments and the regional Aboriginal institutions seek greater powers and responsibilities, 
often at the expense of one another.  Land claim negotiations in the NWT seek devolution within 
a jurisdiction that seeks devolution. This added dimension does not fit the standard framework of 
literature on devolution theory.  
The ISR illustrates the reality that there is no single formula that can be generically 
prescribed for regions with devolved authority in the Northern context (Wilson, 2008).  The 
ongoing land-claim negotiations in the NWT and the push for regional initiatives inside and 
outside the ISR reflect the reality that devolution is a continuing process that unfolds over time 
and is non-linear (Grindle, 2007).   
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Regardless of how that process continues to unfold, what is vital to the future of EA and 
the regulation of oil and gas development going forth in the ISR is that future approaches remain 
community-based, and strive to obtain the proper balance between interests.  The need for a 
regulatory framework capable of balancing the interests of various stakeholders is self-evident, 
as the prospect of significant oil and gas development re-emerges in the region today.  While a 
perfect balance may never be attainable, and there will likely continue to be stakeholders with 
varying concerns and criticisms regardless of future developments within the regulatory regime, 
the framework that has emerged through the ongoing process of devolution does seem to perform 
relatively well under the current circumstances in the Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta region.  It 
does not follow, however, that there are not areas requiring improvement.  Going forward, close 
attention should be paid to the regional initiatives discussed in the previous chapter, as these 
initiatives offer opportunities for EA in the ISR and the broader Arctic to continue improving 
and evolving, ideally towards a more integrated approach with a cumulative-effects monitoring 
system, providing that the initiatives are adequately supported and funded.  Through devolution, 
the shifting nature of the Northern political landscape is what makes it an interesting and unique 
region to do research in, and the ISR is no exception.  It is hoped that this research might play a 
small role in helping stakeholders to better understand perceptions about the efficacy of the 
ISR’s regulatory system.  
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